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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ACCESS TO PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY-Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest
Home, 667 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1981)
INTRODUCTION
On January 7, 1946, the United States Supreme Court, accord-
ing to Justice Reed, established as a principle "that one may re-
main on private property against the will of the owner and con-
trary to the law of the State so long as the only objection to his
presence is that he is exercising an asserted right to spread there
his religious views."1 Justice Reed and two other justices dissented
to the Court's decision in Marsh v. Alabama2 which allowed a Je-
hovah's Witness access to the business block of a privately owned
company town against the wishes of its owners, for purposes of dis-
tributing religious literature.3 The majority in Marsh noted at
length the characteristics of the company town which were the
same as any other American town, including streets, sewers, sewage
disposal, police and a business block.4 The Court concluded that
since the residents and visitors of a public town would not be de-
nied freedom of press and religion, the residents and visitors of a
company town could not be denied these freedoms simply because
a single company held legal title to all the town's property." Since
1946, it has been argued that this principle of Marsh applied to
those who sought access for religious or nonreligious purposes to a
shopping center,' a migrant labor camp,7 an industrial park,8 a mo-
1. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 512 (1946) (Reed, J., dissenting).
2. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
3. Id. at 502.
4. Id. at 502-03.
5. Id. at 505, 509.
6. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner 407
U.S. 551 (1972); Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
7. Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.
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bile home park 9 and a private university.10 For the first time, in
Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest Home,"
an appellate court was asked to apply this principle of Marsh to a
plaintiff who sought access to a privately owned nursing home.
The United States Supreme Court most recently construed
the constitutional implications of Marsh in Hudgens v. NLRB.' 2 In
Hudgens, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the
Constitution protected the right of union members to picket in a
privately owned shopping mall." The Court (quoting Justice
Black's dissent in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc.)" stated that:
The question is, Under what circumstances can private property
be treated as though it were public? The answer that Marsh gives
is when that property has taken on all the attributes of a town,
i.e., 'residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage
disposal plant and a "business block" on which business places
are situated.' I can find nothing in Marsh which indicates that if
one of these features is present, e.g., a business district, this is
sufficient for the Court to confiscate a part of an owner's private
property and give its use to people who want to picket on it.1"
Justice Reed believed that Marsh was a "novel constitutional doc-
trine"16 and he predicted that "such principle may subsequently be
1978); Associacion de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d
130 (3d Cir. 1975); Peterson v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973);
Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G&U, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Oregon v. Cameron, 290 F. Supp. 36 (D. Or. 1968).
8. NLRB v. Solo Cup Co., 422 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1970).
9. Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972).
10. Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
11. 667 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1981). The Court in Cape Cod acknowledged that
they were not aware of any published decisions addressing the applicability of
Marsh to a nursing home. 667 F.2d at 240 n.2. Two additional suits, Health Law
Project v. Sarah Allen Nursing Home, No. 71-1795 (E.D. Pa. filed, July 20, 1971),
and Citizens for Better Care v. Alden Care Enterprises, Inc., No. 72-214876
(Wayne Co. Cir. Ct. Mich. filed, Aug. 11, 1972), have been filed by outsiders who
were denied access to a privately owned nursing home but stipulated settlements
were reached in both cases. These suits are discussed in Nursing Home Access:
Making the Patient Bill of Rights Work, 54 U. DEr. J. Urs. L. 473 (1977).
12. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
13. Id. at 508.
14. 391 U.S. 308, 327 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black was also the
author of the majority opinion in Marsh, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
15. 424 U.S. at 516-17.
16. 326 U.S. at 512.
[Vol. 5:193
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restricted by this Court to the precise facts of this case - that is
to private property in a company town where the owner for his
own advantage has permitted a restrictive public use by his licen-
sees and invitees.' 7 In this regard both Justice Black, the author
of the majority opinion in Marsh, and Justice Reed, the author of
the dissent, seem to concur that only the unique circumstances of
Marsh could prompt such a constitutional remedy. If this is so,
then the Marsh precedent is nearing death as the company town is
on the verge of extinction.18 If the Court in Marsh intended to pro-
vide access in order that, in the name of private property, a cordon
sanitaire would not be created, then Marsh can continue to stand
for the proposition that when extreme circumstances isolate the
public from the normal channels of public information, the Consti-
tution will fashion a remedy. In this note the term "cordon
sanitaire" is used to describe those situations where an owner of
land completely surrounds a population with private property to
the extent that the owner can justify the control of the flow of in-
formation to this population on private property grounds.19
Justice Black's dissent in Logan Valley 0 does not necessarily
mean the end of Marsh. Black's statement was made in response
to a court majority that applied Marsh when only one attribute of
a company town was present and arguably without any of the ex-
treme circumstances which create a cordon sanitaire. Whether
17. Id.
18. The company town has become a relic of the past. A 1974 survey of 190
company towns found more than 150 abandoned or sold to a variety of private
owners. Churcher, In One Company Towns, Some Yearn for the Good Old Days
of Paternalism, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 31. 1974 at 18, col. 1. The Supreme
Court in Central Hardware v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 545 (1972) referred to the
company town as an "economic anachronism rarely encountered today."
19. The term "cordon sanitaire" was used in Logan Valley to describe the
situation in which a business could avoid a direct confrontation with picketers by
surrounding itself with sufficient private property (such as parking lots) to main-
tain a distance between the picketer's message and the object so that the public
would not associate the two. 391 U.S. at 324-25. This note redefines this term so
that it describes the impact created by a landowner who satisfies two criteria.
First, the owner of private property must completely surround a population so
that those seeking access to disseminate information must receive the landowner's
approval or be subject to state trespass laws. Second, the people within the cor-
don sanitaire must not be likely to go beyond the boundary established by the
landowner whether because of physical infirmity (nursing home), conditions of
employment (migrant labor camp) or because all necessaries are provided on site
(company town).
20. 391 U.S. 308, 327 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
1982] 195
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Black, and the Hudgens2' Court, meant that Marsh should apply
only when all the attributes of a town are present or whether they
were demonstrating the extreme circumstances that must be pre-
sent before such a remedy will be invoked is unclear. The former
view leads to a mechanical checklist where even the omission of
one insignificant factor (such as the presence of a sewage disposal
plant) would allow the conclusion that Marsh did not apply. The
latter view leads to the conclusion that the Court's requirement
that all the attributes of a company town be present is not an end
in itself, but instead represents an analytical tool for testing the
extent to which extreme circumstances have created a cordon
sanitaire.
THE CASE
In Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest
Home,2 plaintiffs sought access to a privately owned nursing home
in order to inform the residents of the legal services they pro-
vided. 3 They were repeatedly denied access and on one occasion a
member of plaintiff's council was arrested for criminal trespass.2 4
Plaintiffs brought this action in federal district court alleging an
infringement of their first amendment rights,2 primarily 6 on the
theory that the nursing home was analagous to the company town
in Marsh.2 7 The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal for failure to state a claim,'8 on grounds that
the nursing home could not possibly come within the Marsh ruling
since it was not structurally or functionally similar to a typical mu-
nicipality, was not freely used by the public in general, and the
owner of the nursing home was not performing a full range of mu-
nicipal services, thus standing in the shoes of the State.2 '
Plaintiffs contended that entry to the rest home was necessary
21. 424 U.S. 507.
22. 667 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1981).
23. Id. at 239.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Plaintiffs also contended, unsuccessfully, that a conspiracy existed be-
tween the defendant and the police creating state action. The Court found this
argument insufficient to create "a First Amendment right of access where none
would otherwise exist." Id. 243.
27. Id. at 240.
28. Applying FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. at 239.
29. Id. at 240-41.
[Vol. 5:193
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because the residents' total existence revolved around the rest
home, residents were elderly and frequently infirm, and they sel-
dom ventured from the rest home.3 0 Since the residents were de-
pendent upon the rest home staff and administration for their exis-
tence, plaintiffs also contended that any exposure to outside
sources of information would necessarily have to take place at the
rest home. 31 Plaintiffs relied upon Marsh for the proposition that
they were entitled to access and the State could not enforce its
criminal trespass laws against them as their activity fell withii the
protection of the first amendment. 32
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that
the allegations by the plaintiff were not sufficient to bring the
nursing home within the theory of a company town.3 3 The court
found that a nursing home lacked the streets, homes, sewers and
business block necessary to satisfy the company town require-
ment. 4 The court also found that the nursing home was not acces-
sible to and freely used by the public in general as was the busi-
ness block in Marsh, nor was a nursing home a "traditional public
channel of communication."3 5 Finally, applying the Marsh doc-
trine, the court concluded that the operator of a nursing home had
not "stood in the shoes of the State," through the exercise of mu-
nicipal or quasi-municipal powers.3 In this regard the court
pointed out that no allegations were made that the rest home pro-
vided such public services as police and fire protection or utilities
or that the home had the authority to make and to enforce stan-
dards of conduct, such as criminal statutes, as a delegate of the
state.3
7
In an effort to search for a "valid claim raised by the facts
alleged," the court of appeals was willing to apply "questionable"
modifications of the Marsh doctrine as made by Lloyd Corp., Ltd.
30. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the nursing home provides its residents
a place where they live, sleep, get their meals, receive medical attention, and carry
out their daily activities, including social, cultural, recreational and political activ-
ities. Id. at 240.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 241.
37. Id.
19821
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v. Tanner.3 8 In Lloyd, the Supreme Court introduced the possibil-
ity that private property would have to yield to the first amend-
ment, even when the company town test could not be satisfied, if
adequate alternative avenues of communication were not present.3 9
Thus, the court of appeals considered whether plaintiffs had alter-
native means of communicating their message to the residents
short of a violation of the owner's property rights. Since no allega-
tions were made that direct physical access was the only adequate
means of communication, the Court concluded that plaintiffs could
still reach the residents by phone, by mail, or by an invitation to
enter tendered by a resident.40
BACKGROUND
In Hudgens41 the court prefaced its pivotal analysis of Marsh'
and its progeny by stating: "It is, of course, a commonplace that
the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only
against abridgement by government, federal or state." 3 And,
"[t]his elementary proposition is little more than a truism. But
even truisms are not always unexceptionally true, and an exception
to this one was recognized almost 30 years ago in Marsh v. Ala-
bama. 44 Marsh found its roots in the concept of the public forum
as expressed in Lovell v. Griffin,'5 and Hague v. CIO'" and in the
concept of uncensored individual choice as expressed in Martin v.
City of Struthers.4'7 Both Lovell" and Hague49 dealt with govern-
mental regulations which restricted the rights of citizens to dis-
tribute literature in public places. In response to the Mayor of
Jersey City's contention in Hague that a city ordinance which re-
38. Id. at 241 n.4, citing Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
39. 407 U.S. at 567.
40. 667 F.2d at 241-42. The court cited Massachusetts regulation 105 Code
Mass. Reg. Sec. 150.012(E) which requires nursing homes to have flexible visiting
hours and a means of insuring privacy for both telephone calls and visits. See
also, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, §§ 72D, 70E (West 1981).
41. 424 U.S. 507.
42. 326 U.S. 501.
43. 424 U.S. at 513.
44. Id.
45. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
46. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See also, Note, The Public Forum in Nontraditional
Areas, 51 WASH. L. REv. 142 (1975).
47. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
48. 303 U.S. 444.
49. 307 U.S. 496.
[Vol. 5:193
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quired a permit to meet in a public place was justified, Justice
Roberts stated in dictum that:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been
part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberty of citizens.50
In Martin v. City of Struthers5" the Supreme Court was asked to
determine the constitutionality of a city ordinance which prohib-
ited any person from knocking on doors or ringing doorbells of
residences for the purpose of distributing circulars.5 2 Justice Black,
delivering the opinion of the Court, stressed that it was the deci-
sion of the individual of each household to allow a stranger access
to his house and it was not a community's decision. 3 Black based
this finding on that fact that "[p]amphlets have proved most effec-
tive instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the
most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is
their distribution at the homes of the people." 4 Black also noted
that "door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poor-
ly financed causes of little people." 685
The public forum and uncensored individual choice themes
were signifcantly expanded in Marsh.5 While Lovel1" and Hague"
spoke of public forums in terms of parks, streets and other public
places, Marsh applied the same doctrine to private property which
was the functional equivalent of public property. Marsh also ex-
panded the concept of uncensored individual choice by protecting
that choice, not from government action, but from action of a pri-
vate person whose dominion over the individual was tantamount to
that of government. The concept of uncensored individual choice
may represent the dominant rationale of Marsh.5' Justice Black
championed the cause of all those who lived in company towns by
50. Id. at 515.
51. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
52. Id. at 141-42.
53. Id. at 141.
54. Id. at 145, quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
55. Id. at 146.
56. 326 U.S. 501.
57. 303 U.S. 444.
58. 307 U.S. 496.
59. 326 U.S. 501.
1982]
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stating that:
These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens
of their State and country. Just as all other citizens, they must
make decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation.
To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable
them to be properly informed, their information must be
uncensored. "
Following the Court's decision in Marsh, the doctrine associ-
ated with this case remained relatively inactive for a period of
twenty-two years.6 During this period, the Court declined to re-
view a New York decision in which Marsh was found inapplicable
to a privately owned 129 acre residential apartment complex of
35,000 residents which prohibited Jehovah's Witnesses from enter-
ing any apartment building to canvass, peddle or distribute litera-
ture. 2 In Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.,63 the Supreme Court did not disturb a New
York Court of Appeals finding that the public forum theory was
inapplicable on grounds that "[a] narrow inner hallway on an up-
per floor of an apartment house is hardly an appropriate place at
which to demand free exercise of those ancient rights, '64 and that
"no case we know of extends the reach of the Bill of Rights so far
as to prescribe the reasonable regulation, by an owner of conduct
inside his multiple dwelling." '
60. Id. at 508.
61. The Supreme Court cited Marsh in three civil rights cases in which
Blacks were arrested for demonstrating in privately owned restaurants to protest
segregation. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267 (1963); and Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
62. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948). See also Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981
(1949) in which Marsh was found inapplicable to a privately owned housing de-
velopment of 25,000 people who allegedly discriminated on racial grounds. For a
discussion of both cases see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 321 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
63. 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948).
64. 79 N.E.2d at 436.
65. Id. at 436-37. The New York Court of Appeals factually addressed the
uncensored individual choice theory by stating that the owners polled all of the
residents of the apartment complex and only 30 residents (out of 11,400 who re-
sponded) indicated a desire to be contacted by the Jehovah's Witnesses. The own-
ers of the complex were willing to give the Jehovah's Witnesses permission to
contact these 30 residents. Id. at 434.
[Vol. 5:193200
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What the Court in Watchtower found inconceivable, the
United States Supreme Court made the law of the land in Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.6 In 1968, the
Supreme Court in Logan Valley upheld a union's right to picket a
supermarket inside a shopping center (made up of multiple stores)
on constitutional grounds, citing such similarities between the
company town and the suburban shopping mall as roads, side-
walks, unrestricted access by the public and a business block. 7
While the Court noted that the mall did not have the power to
restrict the flow of information to the community as a whole, as in
Marsh, they found this distinction not determinative of the issue
of access to private property. 8 Instead Justice Marshall, speaking
for five justices, introduced the concept of the cordon sanitaire ar-
guing that if access were not allowed, businesses could use shop-
ping centers to insulate themselves from the protest of workers,
consumers and minorities. 9
The concept of the public forum was also expanded during
this same time period. While Hague,70 Lovell,71 and Marsh72 ap-
plied the concept of a public forum to streets and parks, or their
functional equivalent, cases during this period applied the public
forum doctrine to such non-traditional indoor areas as a school and
a library. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District s7 the Court upheld the right of students to wear
arm-bands in school to protest the Vietnam War, finding that for
this type of speech activity a school was an appropriate public fo-
rum. 4 In Brown v. Louisiana," the Court found, by implication,
that a library was a public forum for purposes of the appellant's
silent protest.76 Tinker77 personifies the Court's strong commit-
ment to freedom of speech. Justice Fortas speaking for the major-
66. 391 U.S. 308.
67. Id. at 317-18.
68. Id. at 318.
69. Id. at 324-25.
70. 307 U.S. 496.
71. 303 U.S. 444.
72. 326 U.S. 501.
73. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
74. The Court stated that "it can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
school house gate." 393 U.S. at 506.
75. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
76. Id. at 140-41.
77. 393 U.S. 503.
19821
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ity stated that "[f]reedom of expression would not truly exist if the
right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent govern-
ment has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. '78
Recognizing that the rights of free speech are not boundless
the Court in Tinker stated that restriction of these rights would be
justified if first amendment activities intruded 'on the work of the
school or the rights of other students to be secure and left alone.7 9
But the Court also stated that fear or apprehension of a distur-
bance is not enough to overcome the right of freedom of expres-
sion.80 With the addition of Tinker and Brown the public forum
concept was expanded in two ways. First, the public forum was
extended to include enclosed areas that differed markedly from
streets and parks. Second, the cases present a balancing test be-
tween rights of the intruder and the privacy rights of those in-
truded upon.
While the public forum concept was being expanded, Logan
Valley's8 expansion of Marshm" was being restricted. Four years
after Logan Valley the Supreme Court in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,83
denied Vietnam War protestors, seeking to distribute hand bills,
access to a shopping mall. Lloyd narrowly construed the holding in
Logan Valley, declaring that Marsh had only been applied to a
shopping mall to the extent that the picketing on the private prop-
erty was directly related to an establishment within the shopping
center.8 4 Thus, while picketing in Logan Valley was upheld be-
cause it was directed at an establishment within the mall, the
protestors in Lloyd8 were denied access because their protest was
directed at the government, not at a store within the mall. Lloyd
expanded this body of law by adding that it would be unwarranted
to infringe on private interests if alternative avenues of communi-
cation existed.8O
78. Id. at 513.
79. Id. at 508.
80. Id.
81. 391 U.S. 308.
82. 326 U.S. 501.
83. 407 U.S. 551.
84. Id. at 560, 563 (citing 391 U.S. at 320 n.9).
85. 407 U.S. 551.
86. Id. at 567. The question as to what constitutes adequate alternative ave-
nues of communication has received extensive analysis in a labor law context be-
ginning with NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). See also Giant
Food Market, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980) where the Court stated
"[ijf reasonableness is a criterion for determining whether or not an alternative
[Vol. 5:1q3
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The subtle distinction between Logan Valley8 7 and Lloyd"
was put to rest in Hudgens.89 Hudgens dealt with striking employ-
ees who sought access to a mall in order to picket their employers'
retail outlet. While faced with facts similar to that of Logan Val-
ley, the Court declared that Lloyd had overruled Logan Valley and
that "the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to
play in a case such as this."'"
Hudgens did not mean that those who sought access to private
property, for purposes of communicating with citizens congregated
therein, were without a legal remedy. The Hudgens Court merely
replaced a statutory remedy for a constitutional one by finding
that the National Labor Relations Act91 provided the basis for de-
termining when private property must yield to greater interests.2
On remand the National Labor Relations Board declared that the
owner of the shopping mall unlawfully interfered with employess
who were picketing a store on the mall's premises.' 3
The Supreme Court continued this trend of finding nonconsti-
tutional justifications for allowing access to private property when
in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins," the Court upheld the
right of students to distribute pamphlets and circulate petitions in
a privately owned shopping center," based on a State of California
Constitutional provision.'6 The Court determined that neither the
means of communications exists, the union should not be forced to incur exorbi-
tant or even heavy expenses." 633 F.2d at 24.
87. 391 U.S. 308.
88. 407 U.S. 551.
89. 424 U.S. 507.
90. Id. at 521.
91. 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1976).
92. 424 U.S. at 521.
93. Scott Hudgens and Local 315, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store
Union, 230 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1977). In Seattle-First National Bank v. NLRB, 651
F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980) the court enforced with only slight modifications a
NLRB order which allowed picketing in the foyer in front of a restaurant on the
46th floor of an office building relying primarily upon Hudgens. For a further
analysis of private property rights and the right to access under the National La-
bor Relations Act see O'Connor, Accommodating Labor's Section 7 Rights to
Picket, Solicit, and Distribute Literature on Quasi-Public Property With the
Owners' Property Rights, 32 MERcER L. REv. 769 (1981).
94. 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
95. Id. at 2038.
96. The California Supreme Court in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,
23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979) determined that Article I,
Sec. 23 of the California Constitution, which guaranteed liberty of speech and
19821
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owner's federally protected property rights nor his first amend-
ment rights are violated by the exercise of state protected rights of
expression in a privately owned shopping mall.97
Appellants in Cape Cod" raised the issue of a constitutional
right to enter a privately owned nursing home at a time when the
Court had determined that a constitutional right of access did not
apply to a shopping mall and that any right of access was to be
determined on nonconstitutional grounds. While a nursing home
and a shopping mall are dissimilar, appellant, by relying upon
Marsh," had to overcome the fact that any interpretation of
Marsh would be shaded by its recent application to shopping
malls.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs contended that the isolation of nursing home res-
idents and their dependecy on nursing home personnel were suffi-
cient reasons for invoking the constitutional protection afforded in
Marsh.100 The court of appeals held that a right of access could not
be justified on either a company town or alternative avenues of
communications theory.101
In reaching this conclusion the Court applied Marsh,1 "1 in a
manner predicted by Justices Reed and Black, by comparing the
physical features of a nursing home to that of the company town.
Short of a company town it is unlikely that any set of physical
features could match those of Marsh. This manner of assessing ac-
cess rights to a nursing home overlooks five critical factors. First,
the decision in Marsh was based on public forum and uncensored
individual choice theories. In Marsh the description of characteris-
tics which made up the company town advanced the public forum
theory by stating that "[o]wnership does not always mean absolute
dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
press, protected the exercise of those rights in a privately owned shopping center.
97. 100 S. Ct. at 2044. See also Note, California Expansion of First Amend-
ment Does Not Infringe on Federally Protected Rights, 32 MEczx L. Rzv. 637
(1981).
98. 667 F.2d 238.
99. 326 U.S. 501.
100. 667 F.2d at 240.
101. Id. at 241-42.
102. 326 U.S. 501.
[Vol. 5:193
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those who use it." '' Marsh suggests that a public forum depends
upon the degree of public use rather than ownership. Later cases
which found a public forum inside a school and a library further
this interpretation. The court of appeals failed to analyze the na-
ture of the facility, the degree to which it is used by outsiders, and
the effect access would have on the work of the facility and the
rights of residents to be secure and left alone. Instead, the Court
relied on the fact that it is not "freely used"'' " and it is "hardly a
traditional public channel of communications."' 0 5 Neither of these
descriptions address the degree to which the facility has been
opened to the public or to other types of special interests and the
effect access would have on the privacy of residents.
Secondly, the descriptive anlaysis in Marsh'" demonstrated
that, in the name of private property, a cordon sanitaire had been
created. The creation of a cordon sanitaire isolated the public from
uncensored sources of information thus requiring a constitutional
remedy. The First Circuit devoted an inordinant amount of atten-
tion to the analysis of the nursing home's physical characteristics
but failed to answer the ultimate question of whether a cordon
sanitaire has been created in a nursing home. The court's state-
ment that the facts alleged "do not reflect this type of similarity to
a typical town"'0 states the obvious, but does not help determine
whether the consequences of living in a nursing home are the same
as living in a company town.
Thirdly, in relying on Lloyd'08 and Hudgens'" to understand
and to apply Marsh, the court failed to note that the controversy
surrounding Marsh has resulted from its application to shopping
malls. The shopping mall cases can be factually distinguised from
the case at bar on the grounds that failure to confront a citizen in
a shopping mall still leaves available all other public places to con-
front the same citizen, but failure to confront a citizen in a nursing
home may leave no other point of confrontation.
Next, the court did not sufficiently analyze alternative means
of communications in light of the circumstances likely to be en-
countered within a nursing home. According to a subcommittee re-
103. Id. at 506.
104. 667 F.2d at 240.
105. Id.
106. 326 U.S. 501.
107. 667 F.2d at 240.
108. 407 U.S. 551.
109. 424 U.S. 507.
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port to a special United States Senate committee on aging and
nursing home care:
The average nursing home patient in the United States is an 82-
year old white woman, widowed, possessing no viable relation-
ships except possibly with a collateral relative of approximately
the same age. Few persons, if any, come to see her. She has ap-
proximately four chronic or crippling diseases and is probably
suffering from some mental impairment. She cannot walk and she
probably requires help in taking a bath, dressing and going to the
bathroom. She takes large quantities of drugs.1
The subcommittee also concluded that:
Nursing home residents are often abused, and this abuse has been
well documented. It includes both physical and psychological mis-
treatment. Many of those persons subjected to abuse are afraid to
report it to relatives or other outsiders for fear nursing home per-
sonnel will retaliate. Because of age, infirmity and fear, the typi-
cal nursing home patient is particularly vulnerable to
mistreatment.""
110. Comment, Nursing Home Access: Making the Patient Bill of Rights
Work, 54 U. Dgr. J. URD. L. 473 (1977) citing the Subcommittee on Long-Term
Care of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Nursing Home Care in the United
States: Failure in Public Policy Introductory Report, S. REP. No. 93-1420 93d
Cong., 2d Ses. 16 (1974). The General Accounting Office reports that the nursing
home population has become increasingly more dependent in recent years as evi-
denced by the fact that in 1973-74 23.5% of nursing home residents were rated as
being capable of independently performing six functions, bathing, dressing, toilet-
ing, transfering, continuence and eating while only 9.6% of residents were able to
perform these functions in 1977. U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTmIG OFFCE, PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS ON PATIENT CHARAcTRPIsTics AND STATE MEDIcAm ExPENDrruRRs FOR
NURSING HoMz CARE, 2-3 (1982).
111. Id. at 474. A more recent and quite exhaustive study of conditions in
nursing homes concludes that:
[Tlhe indifference, neglect, and physical abuse of patients continues: in-
firm old people are left lying for hours in their own excrement; severely
scalded or even drowned in presumably attended bathtubs; illegally re-
strained in 'geriatric chairs' or attacked, sometimes suffering broken
limbs, by nursing home employees. Although the overall quality of nurs-
ing homes improved substantially in the preceding decade, there were
still, in the United States in 1978, nursing homes with green meat and
maggots in the kitchen, narcotics in unlocked cabinets, and disconnected
sprinklers in nonfire-resistant structures. The increasingly small propor-
tion of truly horrible nursing homes may be less distressing in the aggre-
gate, though, than the quality of life in the thousands that meet the min-
imal public standards of adequacy. In these, residents live out the last of
their days in an encloseil society without privacy, dignity, or pleasure,
206 [Vol. 5:193
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The Supreme Court has recently held, in Blum v. Yaretsky, " 2 that
Medicare and Medicaid payments were not sufficient to create
state action in a decision by a nursing home to reassign a pa-
tient.113 Justice Brennan, in his dissent to this decision, stated that
for nursing home patients, "the totality of their social network is
the nursing home community. Within that environment, the nurs-
ing home operator is the immediate authority, the provider of food,
clothing, shelter, and health care, and, in every significant respect,
the functional equivalent of a state."11 ' Given these descriptions of
the conditions present in nursing homes, the court of appeals may
have overly relied upon the use of the telephone or the mail as
adequate alternative means of communication short of access.
While Justice Brennan did not address the issue of abuse by nurs-
ing home operators in his dissent, he recognized the total control
which the operator of a nursing home has over his patients. It is
this total control which breeds the abuses cited above.
Finally, while the Court did indicate that the nursing home
received no government funds, "' it is not clear whether this was
meant to include the non-receipt of medicare " and medicaid re-
imbursement for the care and treatment of patients. " If such re-
imbursements were received the nursing home" would be subject
to the "patient's bill of rights"1" 9 as promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare in 1974 and 1976. This bill
of rights requires that patients in nursing homes which receive
subsisting on minimally palatable diets, multiple sedatives, and large
doses of television-eventually dying ....
B. VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE, THE NURSING HoMz TRAGEDY 4 (1980).
112. 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982).
113. Id. at 2786.
114. 102 S. Ct. 2777, 2798 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. 667 F.2d at 240.
116. Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1974).
117. Id. at §§ 1396a-1396i.
118. The Federal government divides nursing homes into three categories,
skilled nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities, and custodial care facilities,
according to the level of medical care provided in the facility. Of the three catego-
ries only custodial care facilities do not provide any nursing care and are not eligi-
ble for medicare or medicaid reimbursements. Approximately 82% of all nursing
home beds are in skilled or intermediate care facilities. Comment, supra note 110,
at 475. Plaintiffs in Cape Cod did allege that residents of the nursing homes re-
ceived medical treatment at the nursing home, 667 F.2d at 240, but it is not clear
as to whether this refers only to the fact that physicians had access to the nursing
home or that the home itself provided nursing or physician care.
119. 42 C.F.R. § 442.311 (1981) and 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k) (1981).
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medicare or medicaid funds as a reimbursement for patient care,
be given the right to outside representation of their choice120 and
have a right to meet, associate and communicate privately with
persons of their choice. 12 ' These regulatory rights may create an
enforceable right of access independent of constitutional rights as
in the case of the statutory right in Hudgens12 ' and the state con-
stitutional right in Pruneyard.'12 If these rights apply the Court
should have considered them in its opinion. If these rights do not
apply, because no such reimbursements were received, the Court
should have noted this as well, as this fact affects the more general
application of Cape Cod1 2 4 to other nursing home suits.
Other alternatives exist to resolve the issue of access to nurs-
ing homes short of the confused12 5 constitutional arguments which
result from the application of Marsh 26 and its progeny. The owner
of the apartment complex in Watchtower12 7 sought to resolve this
conflict by polling residents of the complex and by allowing access
to all those residents who indicated a desire to hear the outsider's
120. 42 C.F.R. § 442.311(d)(2) (1981).
121. Id. at (i)(1). The regulation states: "Freedom of Association and Corre-
spondence. Each resident must be allowed to - (1) communicate, associate and
meet privately with individuals of his choice, unless this infringes on the rights of
another resident."
The regulations also require that "Each resident must be (1) encouraged and
assisted to exercise his rights as a resident of the ICF (intermediate care facility)
and as a citizen." Id. at (d)(1). These same rights are applied to skilled nursing
facilities through 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(11) (1981). While the Federal regula-
tions only apply to skilled nursing and intermediate care facilities, as a conse-
quence of their receipt of medicare and medicaid funds, North Carolina has ex-
tended these rights to all nursing homes defined as: "an institution ... which is
advertised, announced or maintained for the express or implied purpose of pro-
viding nursing or convalescent care for three or more persons unrelated to the
licensee." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-9(e)(2)(1981). The North Carolina Bill of Pa-
tient's Rights includes the right to "associate and communicate privately and
without restriction with persons and groups of his own choice on his own or their
initiative at any reasonable hour." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-266(8)(1981).
122. 424 U.S. 507.
123. 100 S. Ct. 2035.
124. 667 F.2d 238.
125. Comment, supra note 110, at 498-99. See also Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion in Hudgens in which he states that the law in this area has been
"less than clear." Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. at 523 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
126. 326 U.S. 501.
127. 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433.
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message. 28 A polling solution was also used by the Wayne County
Circuit Court (Michigan)"' to resolve the issue of access in a nurs-
ing home by a federally funded group which provided older Ameri-
cans with counseling. The court ordered that the nursing home be
open for purposes of surveying patient attitudes, and the results
indicated that a large number of residents desired to meet with the
outsiders. 30 This fact provided the foundation for a stipulated set-
tlement allowing access.
Professor Victor Schwartz has proposed that resolution of this
conflict can be found within the common law tort privilege of ne-
cessity.1 38 This privilege allowed an individual whose life or prop-
erty was threatened to protect those interests by entering on to
another's land.' 3 ' Schwartz contends that this privilege could at-
tach to those who sought access to another's land in order to com-
municate ideas if no alternative means of communications ex-
isted, ' if the individual was furthering the public interest rather
than an individual interest,'" and if the intrusion is as limited as
possible to satisfy the intruder's purpose.' 3 ' A request by the plain-
tiffs in Cape Cod'8s to give a semiannual presentation of the ser-
vices they offer in the recreation room of a nursing home, would
likely satisfy all three of Professor Schwartz's requirements.
CONCLUSION
In 1968, Marsh'3 7 became the basis for allowing access to
shopping malls in order to exercise first amendment freedoms.
This extension of Marsh was later repudiated. Nursing homes and
migrant labor camps represent the next controversy in which
Marsh has become the focal point for those that are seeking access
to private property.
The question of whether Marsh applies to nursing homes de-
128. See supra note 65.
129. See supra note 11.
130. Comment, supra note 110, at 491.
131. Schwartz, A Landholder's Right to Possession of Property Versus A
Citizen's Right to Free Speech: Tort Law as a Resource for Conflict Resolution,
45 CI~N. L. Riy. 1, (1976).
132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 15.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 16.
136. 667 F.2d 238.
137. 326 U.S. 501.
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pends upon the test to be used to determine its application. Ac-
cording to Justices Reed and Black, in order for Marsh to apply, a
company town test has to be satisfied. This test requires that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the property to which access is sought
resemble a company town. Factors to be satisfied include: struc-
tural similarities to a town (i.e., streets, sewers, business block),
free public access, and performance of municipal services (i.e., po-
lice, fire, utilities). The application of this test results in decisions
in conformance with every Supreme Court decision which applied
Marsh, with the exception of the repudiated decision in Logan
Valley.'" The First Circuit applied this test in Cape Cod'8' and
concluded, consistent with this test, that Marsh could not be used
as a basis for seeking access to a nursing home.
A second test, which is also consistent with every past Su-
preme Court decision which applied Marsh1 40 with the exception of
Logan Valley,14 1 requires that both a public forum and a cordon
sanitaire be present to apply Marsh. This test would require that a
public forum be determined by the type and degree of public and
resident use of the facility, the intrusion on the operation of the
home and the intrusion on the rights of other residents to be left
alone. This test would also require that a cordon sanitaire'4 2 be
present. This fact would be determined by whether the owner of
private property had the power to restrict the flow of information
to the community as a whole. The application of this test to shop-
ping malls results in a decision which is consistent with Hudg-
ens.14' While the shopping mall may satisfy the public forum por-
tion of the test, it cannot satisfy the cordon sanitaire requirement
as the owner of a mall does not have the authority to restrict the
flow of information to the community as a whole. If this test is
applied to a nursing home, the result reached in Cape Cod"" may
be different depending upon the use of the facility, the effect ac-
cess would have on the operation of the facility, and the nature of
the owner's authority to restrict information.
In the alternative, the practitioner must recognize that Marsh
is not currently favored in the law and that other means of achiev-
138. 391 U.S. 308.
139. 667 F.2d 238.
140. 326 U.S. 501.
141. 391 U.S. 308.
.142. See supra note 19.
143. 424 U.S. 507.
144. 667 F.2d 238.
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ing access to nursing homes will be necessary. Cape Cod represents
a very tentative opinion in its analysis of nonconstitutional alter-
natives to justify access, and it is this area of the law which re-
quires the greatest need of expansion if this access is to be granted.
Federal and state regulations and statutes, which are commonly
referred to as residents' or patients' "bill of rights" might ulti-
mately provide the legal foundation for an outsider's right of ac-
cess to a nursing home.
Lawrence Mazer
19
Mazer: Constitutional Law - Access to Private Property
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1982
